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The author claims that the concept of human rights arose on European soil as a result of 
certain cultural, political, and economic factors. Its primary base is formed by Christian 
ideas, secularized with the dissolution of feudalism and the spread of capitalism. In 
particular, this concept synthesized the Christian ideas of God’s likeness of man and the 
omnipresence of God: being god-like, man, like God, may be present in all things, though 
not in all at once. The main beneficiary was the bourgeoisie, who used personal rights to 
destroy feudal institutions, political rights to establish control over the state, and economic 
and social rights to mitigate class contradictions and distract their opponents. The religious 
origin of rights is the key to understanding their important features such as the absence of 
logical basis for human rights; helplessness of the law in front of acts that undermine the 
foundations of order and are marked as acts of self-realization; extraordinary diversity of 
rights, etc. There are several directions of human rights criticism (conservative, moderate-
liberal, Marxist and Christian). All of them assume that human rights neither adequately 
reflect human nature, nor take into account some of its aspects. Indeed, man is not only an 
individual seeking to choose, but also a member of a collective who needs a recognition 
(conservatism); a being alienated from labor and racial life (Marxism); a believer seeking 
to avoid sin (early Christianity) and obedient to divine will (Islam); a being who suffers 
from constant suffering and seeks to be saved from it (Buddhism); a victim of civilization, 
oppressed by the flow of information and the need for constant choice This inadequacy 
entails a destructive effect: the concept of rights creates a monochrome picture, on which, 
the human existence is reduced to act of will; gives rise to logical contradictions; destroys 
reality, monopolizing the axiological basis of cooperation; is used as a tool of submission 
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and domination; creates an absolute justa causa; alienates from existence and forms 
the basis for other levels of the mythological structure. The history of human rights is not 
complete: It seems that today humanity is on the eve of fundamental transformations, 
whose content and final result are difficult to predict.
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1. human rights are rights that an individual has due to the fact of being a human. 
this simple statement implies several consequences. Firstly, the rights belong to 
an individual from birth, because a human is considered as such immediately 
after leaving the womb of the mother. secondly, they exist independently of their 
recognition by others, since humanity does not depend on external recognition. 
thirdly, they are inalienable, since humanity cannot be interrupted or taken away. 
Fourthly, they are equal, because all humans are such in equal measure.
specialists in the field emphasize the universal character of rights and reveal their 
genealogy in the deep antiquity: the main religious systems; legal codifications of 
the Ancient east; Greek and roman philosophy.1 the institute of rights is considered 
as a great historical achievement, a result of a tense, centuries-old struggle against 
totalitarianism, and a sign of the advent of the Golden Age. these constructions, 
however, are not true. Any culture places humanitarian interests at the centre of its 
value system, but the ideas about its nature and political tools, which are necessary for 
its disclosure, differ significantly. the concept of rights, that has arisen in the european 
culture of the Modern history, considers man as an individual, endowed with free 
will and non-political subject whose purpose is revealed in the act of choice. in other 
cultures, these properties are either denied or are present only in the background.
2. Ancient culture explained the emergence of the world by the action of cosmic 
forces, which were, however, personified.2 the Olympians, who ruled the world, 
did not create it, and therefore were limited in their actions by its general laws 
1  For example, ishay claims that the rights cannot be associated solely with european history: “the 
concept of progressive punishment and justice were professed by hammurabi’s Code of ancient 
Babylon; the hindu and Buddhist religions offered the earliest defenses of the ecosystem; Confucianism 
promoted mass education; the ancient Greeks and romans endorsed natural law and the capacity 
of every individual to reason; Christianity and islam each encouraged human solidarity, just as both 
considered the problem of moral conduct in wartime.” Micheline ishay, The History of Human Rights: 
From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 7 (Berkeley: university of California Press, 2004).
2  For example, homer states: “For to the green earth’s utmost bounds i go, to visit there the parent of 
the Gods, Oceanus, and tethys his espoused, Mother of all.” The Iliad of Homer 347 (w. Cowper (trans.), 
New york: d. Appleton & Co., 1860).
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(Δίκη).3 the effect of these laws was extended to social life. Christianity abolished this 
paradigm. According to the Old testament, the world did not arise spontaneously, 
but was created by God: “in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” 
(Genesis 1:1). God, therefore, was exalted: he ceased to be a significant part of the 
order, subordinated to its laws, and became its sole creator and ruler. thus, the 
objective order, which was determined by nature (inanimate and passive substance), 
was replaced by a subjective order deriving from the divine will. Man, who was 
recognized as a godlike creature, was exalted together with God: “And God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him” (Genesis 1:27).4 instead 
of blood ties with the gods, which were specific to ancient culture, a substantial 
relationship between man and God was established – more sacred and important, 
because thanks to them, man could resurrect after death and take a place next to 
God, and not just go into oblivion. New meanings were expressed directly in the 
holy scripture, which gave them an undeniable character and higher power.
Christian doctrine (represented by Augustine and thomas Aquinas) reformulated 
the concept of freedom. while during the classic Antiquity this concept had mainly 
political connotations, in Christian culture it acquired ontological significance. 
Augustine claimed that free will is given by God, so that a person could earn a reward 
or punishment that express divine justice.5 Act of choice, therefore, was shifted to 
the system of ethical coordinates and began to influence the relations with God 
concerning salvation (and not the relations with other people concerning the 
common good).
3. Christian doctrine paved the way for the renaissance, which proclaimed 
a new program under the guise of a return to ancient models. the key point of this 
program was the accent on the human ability to take any image, independently 
form personality and choose destiny. thus, individuality (dissimilarity to others) 
became the main characteristic of human being, a fact that makes man human. this 
meant giving up the antic ideal of traditional virtues and the early Christian ideal 
of the ascension of the soul to God.6 the new ideal synthesized the Christian ideas 
3  Pythia proclaimed in one of her prophecies: “No one may escape his destined lot, not even a god.” 
Herodotus. Vol. 1 117 (A.d. Godley (ed.), London; New york: w. heinemann; G.P. Putnam’s sons, 1920).
4  Ancient culture used metaphors associated with Godlikeness, only as a rhetorical adornment and only in 
relation to prominent personalities, such as hercules, Orestes, Odysseus. See Iliad and Odyssey of homer.
5  hence the idea of two freedoms: a genuine one (from sin), bringing a person closer to God, and an 
animal one, which consists in following bad desires and separates a person from God.
6  According to Batkin, before the renaissance, I was assessed adversely, or, in any case, perceived not 
by itself, but only in the context of involvement in a certain community. Allocation presupposed 
standardization, i.e. the greatest degree of inclusiveness and normativity, and, therefore, something 
opposite to individuality. the individual saw the highest dignity in following the pattern and being 
himself as little as possible. in the renaissance, a transition was made to the substantiation of personality 
from itself; from now on life and death amaze not by repeatability, but by uniqueness. Баткин Л.М. 
Итальянское Возрождение в поисках индивидуальности [Leonid M. Batkin, Italian Renaissance in 
Search of Individuality] 3–31 (Moscow: Nauka, 1989).
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of God’s likeness of man and the omnipresence of God:7 being god-like, man, like 
God, may be present in all things, though not in all at once.8 it was most clearly set 
forth in the treatise of Mirandola Oratio de hominis dignitate (1496).9
renaissance thinkers rarely raised the question of Godlikeness, preferring to 
characterize man with enthusiastic epithets (“a great miracle and a being worthy 
of all admiration,” “partly heavenly and divine, partly finest and noblest of all mortal 
things”10); nevertheless, this fundamental concept could not be ignored by them, – 
the same Mirandola stated:
and that the saying of Aspah the Prophet, “you are all Gods and sons of the 
Most high,” might rather be true.
in addition, this synthesis was clearly expressed in the works and artistic images 
of the renaissance, whose greatness and uniqueness are determined not only by the 
talents of the authors, but also by the intellectual component. Good examples are 
Brunetto Latini’s Tesoro and dante’s Divine Comedy, which claim to create a complete 
picture of the world; the fresco of the sistine Chapel by Michelangelo, which depicts 
the creation of man, and perhaps the most famous image – the ambiguous smile of 
Mona Lisa, expressing at “the contrast between reserve and seduction, and between 
7  the idea of omnipresence is also expressed in the Bible: “who has measured the waters in the hollow of his 
hand and marked off the heavens with a span, enclosed the dust of the earth in a measure and weighed 
the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance” (isaiah 40:12); “Am i a God at hand, declares the Lord, 
and not a God far away? Can a man hide himself in secret places so that i cannot see him? declares the 
Lord. do i not fill heaven and earth? declares the Lord” (Jeremiah 23:23-24); “you hem me in, behind and 
before, and lay your hand upon me” (Psalms 139:5). Promoting this idea is largely the merit of thomas 
Aquinas, who dedicated to it a treatise De Ente et Essentia ad fratres et socios suos and the eighth question 
of the first part of Summa Theologiae, containing the conclusion: “it must be the case that God exists 
within all things and intimately so.” thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (A.J. Freddoso (trans.)) (May 4, 
2020), available at https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/tOC-part1-2.htm.
8  Толстых В.Л. Ренессансное понимание достоинства и его влияние на современную концепцию 
прав человека // Правоведение. 2016. № 2. С. 48–61 [vladislav L. tolstykh, Renaissance Understanding 
of Dignity and its Influence on the Modern Concept of Human Rights, 2 Jurisprudence 48 (2016)].
9  According to Mirandola, when God created man, all images were already distributed. then God gave 
Man an indefinite image: “we have given you, O Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor endowment 
properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with 
premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgement and 
decision. the nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which we have laid 
down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody 
we have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature ... we have made you 
a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the 
free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. it will be in 
your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your own decision, 
to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine.” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the 
Dignity of Man (1496) (May 4, 2020), available at http://web.mnstate.edu.
10  Альберти Л.Б. Книги о семье [Leon B. Alberti, On the Family] 124 (Moscow: iazyki slavianskoi kultury, 
2008).
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the most devoted tenderness and a sensuality that is ruthlessly demanding – 
consuming men.”11
Another important consequence of the above-mentioned synthesis was the 
transformation of the function of money. during Antiquity and the high middle 
ages, the criterion of the social status was a contribution to the common cause (res 
publica) or pedigree; money only increased the opportunities associated with this 
status. in modern society the role of money has become decisive. this is not about 
establishing a correlation between money and personal merit (hard work, talent, 
pedigree, etc.), and not about the admiration of a person who has and consumes 
material goods, inaccessible to others,12 but about the respect shown to the potency 
of the rich person, i.e. to his ability to be anyone through buying anything. this 
potency is nothing more than a claim to Godlikeness. the roots of capitalism in 
this sense are much deeper than weber believed and reflect not so much the belief 
of the modern bourgeoisie that it is divinely anointed,13 but the very essence of 
Christianity, which elevated man over the world.14
Medieval nominalism – a philosophical doctrine that only recognized the existence 
of particular objects and denied the existence of common ideas (universals) – also 
played a role in the genesis of rights. According to Ockham the reason for this denial 
was the absolute freedom of God, i.e. its unboundedness by nothing, including 
universals. On the philosophical field, nominalism supplanted Platonism and other 
doctrines that were calling for going beyond the limits of directly perceived reality, 
and grounded important philosophical categories, such as “freedom,” “value,” “world,” 
etc. in the sphere of politics, it became “the ideology of burgher individualism,”15 
denying the value of feudal institutions.
4. the reformation declared the possibility of direct contact between the believer 
and God, which does not require the mediation of the Pope and the priests, and 
11  sigmund Freud, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis: Leonardo da Vinci and Other Works 108 (London: the 
hogarth Press and the institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957).
12  smith wrote that the rich “consume little more than the poor.” Adam smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments 246 (strand; edinburgh: A. Millar; A. kincaid & J. Bell, 1761).
13  See Max weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New york: Charles scribner’s sons, 1958).
14  Marx wrote: “By possessing the property of buying everything, by possessing the property of appropriating 
all objects, money is thus the object of eminent possession … that which is for me through the medium 
of money – that for which i can pay (i.e., which money can buy) – that am I myself, the possessor of the 
money. the extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money’s properties are my – 
the possessor’s – properties and essential powers … do not i, who thanks to money am capable of 
all that the human heart longs for, possess all human capacities?” karl Marx, The Power of Money in 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marxists internet Archive (May 4, 2020), available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/power.htm#:~:text=shakespeare%20
excellently%20depicts%20the%20real,the%20possessor%20of%20the%20money.
15  Философская энциклопедия. Т. 4 [Philosophical Encyclopedia. Vol. 4] 91 (F.v. konstantinov (ed.), 
Moscow: sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1967).
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thus extended the idea of personal freedom, inspired by the Church, to relationships 
within the Church itself. this slogan had not only religious, but also political and 
economic significance: it followed that the claims of the Church to the legitimation 
of political power and economic preferences were unfounded. having lost the 
ideological foundation, the political order became unstable, which was reflected in 
a series of religious wars and uprisings of the 16th–17th centuries. it became necessary 
to find a new foundation of political power which would relate to the idea of personal 
freedom. this role was played by the social contract theory.
All three main versions of this theory are based on the fact that in the state of 
nature people had unlimited rights (natural freedom), that they voluntarily refused in 
the interests of security when creating the state. According to hobbes, the individual 
completely entrusts himself to the state;16 according to Locke, he only concedes 
the natural power to punish those who encroach on his rights;17 according to 
rousseau, innate rights are not preserved, but are transformed into civil rights.18 
therefore, expression of individual will (albeit, existing only as a presumption and not 
accompanied by the granting of real political rights) became the source of political 
power and objective law, whose main function was defined as the protection of 
personal rights exercised through their restriction.
the social contract theory became the basis of a radical political transformation 
of the 17th century, during which the feudal political model was destroyed, right 
to private war was abolished, the modern state was established, and political 
nations were formed. the main initiator of this transformation (revolution) was the 
bourgeoisie, which sought to protect property, create unified markets, diminish 
the influence of other classes and conclude an alliance with the monarchy. human 
rights were used as a tool of change: according to Marx, by recognizing only 
individual importance of life, they destroyed the feudal estates, corporations and 
guilds, divided civil society into selfish individuals and thereby attached them to 
the state.19 As a result, a duality of state and civil society, which was unknown to 
feudalism, emerged.
5. in the 17th century, personal rights were highlighted, as their protection was 
initially the main purpose of the state. By the end of the 18th century, the bourgeoisie 
had become strong enough to begin the struggle for control of the state. the 
culmination of this struggle was the American war of independence (1775–1783) and 
16  thomas hobbes, Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil 
(London: Andrew Crooke, 1651).
17  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Awnsham Churchill, 1689).
18  Jean-Jacques rousseau, The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel 
rey, 1762).
19  karl Marx, On the Jewish Question in Works of Karl Marx 1844, Marxists internet Archive (May 4, 2020), 
available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question.
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the French revolution (1789–1799). its outcome was the removal of the aristocracy 
from power, consolidation of the republican form of government (however, different 
from the ancient models) and general adoption of universal suffrage. the new model 
has spread not only in europe, but also abroad.
in parallel to the struggle for control of the state, the bourgeoisie fought for 
independence from the state. the theoretical basis for this was liberalism, developing 
the ideas of Locke.20 the liberal agenda included universal peace, free trade, 
decolonization, representative democracy and technological progress. its gradual 
implementation in the late 19th – early 20th centuries ensured the dominance of 
the bourgeoisie in the political sphere and establishment of capitalism as the main 
mode of production and the only social model. the international law became one 
of the tools of liberalism. its new reformative function overshadowed its traditional 
function of resolving interstate conflicts.21
New tendencies were supported by German classical philosophy, which 
definitively secularized (i.e. freed from the religious context) the idea of freedom. 
hegel defined human history as progress in the awareness of freedom, of which 
the state is the main advocate and vehicle.22 kant defined dignity as the ability of 
a rational being to self-determine and comprehend duty as a goal (“to legislate in 
the realm of goals”); autonomous will, committing acts based on beliefs is a matter 
of direct respect; this human quality is immanent, since nature and skill do not 
contain anything that can replace it.23 while creating a semblance of discussion in 
essence, all these concepts do not overcome the ancient and deep-rooted religious 
myth about the will, but only adapt this myth to new circumstances and protect it 
from real alternatives.
the First world war, the Great October revolution, the Great depression, and 
nationalist and labor movements created a threat to liberal values and the political 
order derived from them. the liberal reaction was to develop the concept of the 
welfare state (Sozialstaat), redistributing resources and supporting social justice, 
emphasize protection of economic and social rights and develop the concept of 
the New economic Order. thus, there were concessions in favor of disadvantaged 
20  Constant claimed: “the aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among the citizens of the 
same fatherland: this is what they called liberty. the aim of the moderns is the enjoyment of security 
in private pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures.” 
Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns (1819) (May 4, 2020), 
available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/constant-the-liberty-of-ancients-compared-with-that-
of-moderns-1819.
21  See Martti koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2001).
22  Georg w.F. hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte [Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History] (e. Gans (ed.), Berlin: duncker & humblot, 1837).
23  immanuel kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 1998).
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classes and developing countries, designed to ensure the stability of the existing 
order. these concessions, however, were either incomplete or only symbolic.
the end of the Cold war in the late 80s was perceived as a decisive victory 
of liberalism and the “end of history.”24 the modern stage is characterized by the 
consistent dismantling sovereignty, erosion of social and economic rights (often 
carried out under the guise of their more effective implementation), development 
of information technologies that allow the manipulation of people and states, the 
emergence of a spectrum of somatic rights affecting the physical nature of man. 
human rights began to be used as a pretext for intervention, destroying social 
organization and causing a sharp decline in the standard of living. All these changes 
reflect the formation of a new global model of power.
in the modern law and order, the idea of rights restrains the totalitarian aspirations 
of particular states, imposing on them the responsibility to establish a democratic 
system and protect rights, while simultaneously consolidating the international 
order. in the latter case, it is formulated as the main task of a global sovereign, 
not vulnerable to the disease of totalitarianism, and determines the emergence of 
the right to secession, sanctions regime, recognition issues, validity of treaties and 
reservations to them, sovereign immunities, etc.
6. the religious origin of rights is the key to understanding many of their important 
features. Firstly, it explains the absence of logical basis for human rights (the fact 
that they are set as an a priori, self-supporting truth25), their claims to absolute 
priority (the status of “trumps”26) and their intolerance.27 Secondly, it explains the 
helplessness of the law in front of acts that undermine the foundations of order and 
are marked as acts of self-realization. indeed, if man is omnipresent and this reflects 
divine providence, any incarnation is sanctioned by a higher power. in traditional 
24  Fukuyama states in his famous article: “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold 
war, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the 
end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.” Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16(3) the National 
interest 3 (1989).
25  during a discussion of the draft of the universal declaration presented by John humphrey, director of 
the human rights division of the u.N. secretariat, Colonel william roy hodgson of Australia, erupted, 
saying that it seemed to him that there was no order in this document. he demanded to know from 
the secretariat what was the philosophy behind this paper. the answer from Mr. humphrey was 
that he could not oblige Colonel hodgson “for the simple reason that [the draft] is based on no 
philosophy whatsoever.” As far as he was concerned, he had been asked to compile a list of rights 
for discussion purposes and that was what he had done. sienho yee, Towards an International Law of 
Co-progressiveness 290 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).
26  See ronald dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 153 (London: duckworth, 1978).
27  de Benoist claims: “the ideology of human rights theoretically based on the principle of tolerance 
is in fact the bearer of the most violent intolerance, the most absolute challenge. the declarations 
of rights are declarations of war as well as declarations of love.” Де Бенуа А. Против либерализма. 
К четвертой политической теории [Alain de Benoist, Against Liberalism. To the Fourth Political Theory] 
339 (st. Petersburg: Amphora, 2009).
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societies, this problem was removed through an appeal to the public interest; today, 
an appeal to another private interest is more effective (hence the justification for 
actions that do not threaten the rights of others: homosexuality, euthanasia, cloning, 
etc.). the concept of public interest has lost its previous meaning: the principle 
of proportionality implies weighing public and private interests as equivalent 
while in traditional society, public interest prevailed initially.28 Thirdly, it explains an 
extraordinary diversity of rights that permeate not only the public sphere, but also 
the spheres of intimate and family life, work and rest, religion and art, etc. it also 
explains the legalization of deviant behavior: the right to enter into a homosexual 
marriage or the right to in vitro fertilization is important not on its own, but as an 
extension of the ontological horizon. Moreover, they are much more important than 
the rights to enter into ordinary marriage or ordinary motherhood, which, by virtue 
of their commonness, do not extend the existential space.
the expansion of rights entails the formalization and standardization of relations 
(aspects of non-freedom and demoralization).29 Formalization, i.e. the consolidation 
of clear and rationally calculated patterns is ensured through the use of a dry and 
senseless legal language. standardisation, implying the mass reproduction of 
particular patterns, is ensured by the normativity of rights. thus, the expansion 
of rights transforms the human existence, – it ceases to be a fate set by objective 
circumstances and personal choice, becoming the realization of the law. in the 
essay Question Concerning Technology heidegger defines technology as “a way of 
revealing,” “which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supplies energy 
that can be extracted and stored as such.” the danger is that it could be denied to 
man, “to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of 
a more primal truth.”30 this principle of reduction also applies to rights, which reveal 
the human existence only in a certain way, transform man into the legal construction 
(legal creature embedded in the body of Leviathan and designed to fill it with its 
energy) and exclude alternative forms of being.
7. Another paradox of rights is that the incarnation of a person in one image 
deprives him of the opportunity to incarnate into other images and thereby destroys 
dignity. therefore, it is necessary to have dignity, without realizing it: to be an eternal 
buyer, wandering around the store, trying on different things, but never making 
28  An interesting aspect of the problem was revealed by the Charlie Hebdo case: the reaction to the 
murder was not the reaction of society as a whole, but of individuals who identified themselves with 
the dead journalists. thus the enthusiasm evoked by the slogan Je suis Charlie reflects a more general 
trend of dissemination of individualism even in the field of criminal policy.
29  the phenomenon of legalization was analyzed by Meckled-García and Çali, who define rights as 
a moral ideal and point out three problems: the law should not clarify a moral ideal; the law is not 
the only means of protecting a moral ideal; effectiveness of the law in protecting a moral ideal is not 
proven. The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human 
Rights Law 1–3 (s. Meckled-García & B. Çali (eds.), London: routledge, 2006).
30  Martin heidegger, Basic Writings (New york: harper & row, 1977).
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a choice; leaving without buying, but retaining purchasing power. so, the idea of 
dignity turns out to be close to postmodernity – the state of “oscillation as freedom.”31 
this dialectical trend determines the nature of lawmaking and human rights activities 
aimed at upholding not specific values, but only their possibility.
the values themselves become uninteresting and pushed into the background; 
the phrase “i disapprove of what you say, but i will defend to the death your right 
to say it” (hall) expresses the extreme degree of this paradox, which is no longer 
recognized as a paradox. Neither international law nor internal law seeks to ensure 
the real enjoyment of the rights by the masses; neither the european Court of human 
rights nor any other authority is concerned that so few people exercise the freedom 
of speech in the public sphere or use freedom of conscience to form firm and sincere 
convictions. Being ignored by the law, realization of rights on governments and 
capital, and not on the principle of formal equality:
the only human right which is universally enforced is the right of the rich 
to get richer.32
the priority of opportunity changes human relationships. People increasingly 
plan and talk about plans and implement them less and less: thus, thinking of 
possibility affirms the illusion of immortality, that the death changed into, and the 
illusion of equality, that the inequality did. without realizing dignity, man does not 
individualize and remains “a man without definition,”33 “a man without properties, 
an individual in the capacity of his own potential,”34 – someone who was described 
in the following way: “i know your works: you are neither cold nor hot. would that 
you were either cold or hot! so, because you are lukewarm, and neither hot nor cold, 
i will spit you out of my mouth” (revelation 3:15-16). such a person is the ideal unit of 
representative democracy, a point of pure reference, which can be invoked to justify 
any political program, and which will never ask whether the promise made to it is 
fulfilled, simply because the only thing, that interests him, is promises.
8. in legal discourse, the concept of rights reigns almost completely. Beyond this 
discourse, it is subjected to criticism, which, however, is marginal, i.e. not known 
by broad masses and not supported by political elites. the conservative criticism 
is based on the claim that man is determined through social relations and needs 
recognition. insisting on the autonomy of the individual, rights suppress human 
nature, break social ties and generate anarchy. the main theses of this criticism were 
31  Gianni vattimo, The Transparent Society 10–11 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
32  Philip Allot, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State 92 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2002).
33  Claude Lefort, L’Invention démocratique 64 (Paris: Fayard, 1981).
34  Batkin 1989, at 169.
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set forth by Burke in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). the moderate-
liberal criticism is adjacent to the conservative one and set forth by Bentham in 
Anarchical Fallacies (1816). Bentham doubts the need for rights: in a country where 
power belongs to the people, everything has been done to prevent abuse. Freedom, 
given by the rights, refers to the wild condition; thanks to the state man came out 
of this condition, obeyed the laws and connected himself with others. there were 
no rights prior to the establishment of governments: a right implies guarantees of 
future use, but in the wild condition man does not have such guarantees.
Marxism sees human rights as an instrument for the destruction of feudal 
institutions and the creation of a modern state. through citizens’ rights, man lives 
in a political community and considers himself as a means; through human rights, 
he acts as a private individual and regards other men as a means. Citizens’ rights are 
subordinated to human rights: the political community degrades itself into a simple 
means to preserve human rights. under these conditions, human emancipation is 
impossible; it will be accomplished only when “the real, individual man re-absorbs in 
himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-
being in his everyday life.”35 thus, like conservatives, Marx proceeds from the social 
nature of man, but unlike them, he believes that this nature is not revealed even in 
traditional societies based on economic exploitation. the issue of rights also relates 
to the concept of alienation, outlined by Marx and developed by neo-Marxists 
(Frankfurt school and Fromm): by separating power and society, rights alienate 
man from politics; by defending the capitalist property, they alienate man from his 
labor; by imposing false needs, they alienate man from his nature.
the Christian criticism is based on the fact that man is not autonomous but 
is connected with God. rights, that focus on choice determined by one’s own 
preferences, and not by the divine will, seek to break this bond. in politics, this leads 
to the spread of immoral notions and practices and the undermining of the common 
good. Christian criticism is based on the concept of two freedoms, outlined by st. 
Augustine and developed by thomas Aquinas. Natural freedom implies following 
one’s own desires and makes man a slave of sin, “everyone who practices sin is a slave” 
(John 8:34). Freedom from sin implies obedience to the commandments and is 
a condition of salvation, “if the son sets you free, you will be free indeed” (John 8:36). 
human rights express the first freedom and impede the realization of the second one. 
the catholic criticism was formulated in several papal encyclicals of the 19th century, 
in particular, in the encyclical of Leo Xiii Libertas praestantissimum donum (1888).36 in 
the second half of the 20th century the vatican changed its position and supported 
35  Marx, supra note 19.
36  Pope Leo Xiii, Libertas: Encyclical on the Nature of Human Liberty, the holy see (May 4, 2020), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.
html. See also encyclical of Pius vi Adeo Nota (1791), encyclical of Gregory Xvi Mirari Vos (1832), 
encyclical of Pius iX Quanta Cura (1864).
VLADISLAV TOLSTYKH 115
the concept of rights.37 Orthodox criticism of rights was formulated in The Russian 
Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights (2008).38
islam defines human rights as a divine gift and requires them to be exercised 
in accordance with the sharia. this implies a ban on anti-islamic proselytism, an 
emphasis on the duties of man before God, assumption of the death penalty and 
corporal punishment, differences in the status of men and women, etc. thus the 
islamic concept of rights de facto is a completely independent concept which has 
little to do with the western one.39 it is set forth in the Cairo declaration on human 
rights in islam (1990).40 it should be noted that the Quran does not mention the 
idea of the human Godlikeness: Allah created man “in whatever shape he willed” 
(Quran 82:8). this idea, however, can be derived from some hadiths, the correct 
interpretation of which is the subject of discussion.41
9. Modern criticism mainly develops classical arguments. soviet authors used 
both conservative and Marxist arguments and saw in human rights a threat to 
sovereignty and an instrument of imperialism. during discussing the draft of the 
universal declaration, vyshinsky stated:
human rights are unthinkable outside the state. the very concept of law 
is a state concept. Moreover, human rights are unthinkable without their 
being protected and protected by the state. Otherwise, human rights turn 
into an empty abstraction.42
Neo-Marxist Lefort writes that a society of free and equal people is indefinable; 
in modern politics, man acts through intermediaries; therefore, his rights are only 
37  See encyclical of John XXiii Pacem in Terris (1963), Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
world Gaudium et Spes (1965), Addresses of Popes to the u.N. General Assembly, etc.
38  the russian Orthodox Church’s Basic teaching on human dignity, Freedom and rights, the russian 
Orthodox Church (May 4, 2020), available at https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/.
39  According to syukiyaynen, “Modern islamic law formally recognizes most human rights and freedoms 
in their liberal interpretation, but makes them dependent on compliance with imperative regulations 
of sharia, which significantly changes the very nature of the institution of human rights.” Сюкияйнен Л. 
Современные религиозные концепции прав человека: сопоставление теологического и юри-
дического подходов // Право. Журнал Высшей школы экономики. 2012. № 3. С. 28 [Leonid 
syukiyaynen, Modern Religious Concepts of Human Rights: A Comparison of Theological and Legal 
Approaches, 3 Law. Journal of the higher school of economics 7, 28 (2012)].
40  See syed Abul ʻAla Maudoodi, Human Rights in Islam (Lahore: islamic Publications Ltd., 1977).
41  See, e.g., the Hadith № 2612 of sahih Muslim (“when any one of you fights with his brother, he should 
avoid his face for Allah created Adam in his own image” ((May 4, 2020), available at https://sunnah.
com/muslim/45).
42  About the speech on the draft declaration of human rights at the General Assembly session on 
10 december 1948, see Вышинский А.Я. Вопросы международного права и международной 
политики [Andrey ya. vyshinsky, Issues of International Law and International Politics] 379–388 
(Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1951).
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proclaimed, but not realized. Focusing on the expression of identity, the concept 
of rights takes the individual out of the community and destroys power, law and 
knowledge.43 Žižek reproduces a part of the Bentham arguments: human rights 
are a form of fundamentalism and, while displacing the politics, they provoke non-
political conflicts; offer a limited range of options and impose a modus of individual 
choice (forbid from taking anything without an act of choice); create a pretext for 
intervention and prohibit collective reform.44 Baudrillard sees in rights an evidence 
of alienation:
if something goes without saying, then every right becomes spare, but if 
it becomes necessary to establish a right in relation to one or another thing, 
then this means that this thing itself is approaching its own destruction. so, 
the right to water, air, space “confirms” the rapid disappearance of all these 
elements.45
Agamben develops the basic idea of Burke that rights provoke the state violence 
and act as a vehicle of totalitarianism:
the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts 
with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing 
inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new 
and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they 
wanted to liberate themselves.46
van dun blames Marx for the expansion of rights. Marx called for the unification 
of man with humanity. this gnostic position asserts the universal man, which 
overshadows an individual with his needs. the cult of the universal man masks the 
lack of respect for oneself and others, destroys the law and strengthens hedonism.47 
the critical thought denies the natural character of rights and claims that their main 
function is to confront the state. this ensures a balance between the requirements 
of order and autonomy. this balance is the essence of the liberal theory. Not being 
natural, human rights are not defined: their content depends on the will of political 
43  Lefort 1981, at 62–69, 170–173.
44  slavoj Žižek, Against Human Rights, 34 New Left review 115 (2005).
45  Бодрийяр Ж. Прозрачность зла [Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil] 127–131 (Moscow: 
dobrosvet, 2000).
46  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life 72 (d. heller-roazen (trans.), stanford: 
stanford university Press, 1998).
47  Frank van dun, Les Droits de l’Homme et la crise du droit (institut euro-1992, 1998).
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actors. this will is determined by factors specific to each society: economic formation, 
form of the state, social and political challenges, etc.48
10. the inadequacy of explanation of human nature through the prism of the 
individual will is obvious. Man is not only an individual seeking to choose, but also 
a member of a collective who needs recognition (conservatism); being alienated 
from labor and racial life (Marxism); believer seeking to avoid sin (early Christianity) 
and obedient to divine will (islam); who suffers constantly and seeks to be saved 
from it (Buddhism); victim of civilization, oppressed by the flow of information and 
need for constant choice (Baudrillard, Žižek). thus, the idea of rights emphasizes only 
certain aspects of reality and ignore (cut off) the rest. Because of this, it is a myth.49
the destructive impact of this myth is manifested in the following. First, it creates 
a monochrome picture, on which the being of a person is reduced to an act of will; the 
doctrine based on it operates with a narrow circle of arguments and is not capable of 
the three-dimensional vision of reality. Second, it gives rise to logical contradictions: 
the idea of rights is not adapted to the conflicts of individuals and situations of 
voluntary waiver of rights; does not cope with the role of common standard; is 
ineffective if an individual is separated from the collective (the Arendt’s paradox). 
within the discourse of international law, it conflicts with the idea of sovereignty, 
which also reflects the idea of will; in the absence of a third force, this conflict does 
not have a logical solution and can only be overcome in a political way (hence the 
ambiguity of such issues as the impact of rights on immunities or reservations). Third, 
it destroys reality, monopolizing the axiological basis of cooperation and, as a result, 
blocking real cooperation in overcoming poverty, protecting the environment, state-
building, etc. its contribution to the real well-being of people cannot be completely 
denied – this contribution, however, takes a back seat to the disasters provoked by it. 
Fourth, it is used as a tool of submission and domination. it creates an absolute justa 
causa, relying on which the west instigates civil wars, intervenes in internal affairs 
and destroys entire countries. Fifth, it alienates from existence. indeed, rights create 
a new kind of man – man who chooses (Homo Elehit) and is unable to reveal his own 
nature and see the reality in its entirety. Moreover, the choice, that rights offer, is 
a hoax: Commodities, cultural phenomena and political ideas are not much different 
from each other and seem to be created as a plurality with only one purpose – to 
keep attention. Sixth, it forms the basis for other levels of the mythological structure: 
No matter how brave or educated a person is and no matter how far he goes in the 
48  See Martti koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law 131–167 (London: hart Publishing, 2011).
49  Burke wrote: “in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive 
rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections that it becomes absurd to talk of 
them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction. the nature of man is intricate; 
the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple disposition 
or direction of power can be suitable either to man’s nature or to the quality of his affairs.” edmund 
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: J. dodsley, 1790).
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fight against global deception, in the end he always faces an opponent who cannot 
be defeated – his own individuality.50
the general conclusion is that human rights are something more than the product 
of Modern history, resulting from the development of humanistic ideas within legal 
doctrine. they are organically and inextricably linked with the religious concepts of 
the mature Middle Ages and reflect the idea of Godlikeness that forms a very special 
personality type transcendental to western civilization. Consequently, challenging 
rights within a purely legal discourse is a hopeless affair, – legal doctrine does not 
reach deep ontological levels. thus, an alternative can be found only outside of 
positive law and only under certain historical conditions. the world is changing: its 
fragmentation, the west’s loss of leadership and general crisis of western culture – 
all of which can cause the corrosion of this dominant personality type and its 
replacement by a new type.
References
Agamben G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (d. heller-roazen (trans.), 
stanford: stanford university Press, 1998).
Allot P. The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2002). https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493676
Burke e. Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: J. dodsley, 1790).
dworkin r. Taking Rights Seriously (London: duckworth, 1978).
Freud s. Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis: Leonardo da Vinci and Other Works 
(London: the hogarth Press and the institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957).
hobbes t. Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651).
ishay M. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 
(Berkeley: university of California Press, 2004).
koskenniemi k. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2001). https://doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9780511494222
koskenniemi M. The Politics of International Law (London: hart Publishing, 2011). 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472565587
Lefort C. L’Invention démocratique (Paris: Fayard, 1981).
Locke J. Two Treatises of Government (London: Awnsham Churchill, 1689).
50  this structure consists of five levels. the first, basic level is formed by the ideas of sovereignty and rights; 
the second – by the liberal ideas of the 19th century (peaceful settlement of disputes, international 
governance, free trade, humanization of war, etc.; the third – by the idea of an international crime 
formulated after the second world war and applicable to the actions of states (aggressive war) and the 
actions of individuals (terrorism), the fourth – by the neoliberal ideas of the second half of the 20th century 
(general sovereign, sustainable development, common heritage, monetarism, responsibility to protect, 
etc.); the fifth, emerging level – by the idea of technology.
VLADISLAV TOLSTYKH 119
Maudoodi s.A. Human Rights in Islam (Lahore: islamic Publications Ltd., 1977).
vattimo G. The Transparent Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New york: Charles 
scribner’s sons, 1958).
yee s. Towards an International Law of Co-progressiveness (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004).
Information about the author
Vladislav Tolstykh (Moscow, Russia) – Professor, department of international 
Law, Moscow state institute of international relations (76 vernadskogo Av., Moscow, 
119454, russia; e-mail: vlt73@mail.ru).
